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RECENT CASE NOTES
fendant answered fraud, and the plaintiffs' reply was a general denial.
The Supreme Court said that "no question as to plaintiff's being a good-
faith purchaser can be raised under the issues. If the appellant were a
good-faith purchaser, before maturity, of commercial paper, the burden
was on him affirmatively to plead and to prove the same on the trial." It
would seem a logical inference from the above statements that an answer
alleging fraud is not vulnerable to demurrer since under the Indiana rule
the burden of proving due course holding, which includes as one element
lack of knowledge of the fraud, is on the plaintiff holder, when the
defendant has established the evidence of the fraud. It would seem to
follow that the burden of allegation is satisfied by an answer which alleges
fraud; for if the defendant in his answer must allege both the fact of
fraud and the fact of the plaintiff holder's knowledge of the fraud, he is
required to allege a fact which he is not required to prove. T. R. D.
EMINENT DOMAIN-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION-The State of Indiana under the provisions of the Indiana State
Highway Act (Burns' 1926, Sec. 8268 et seq.) and the general Eminent
Domain Act (Burns' 1926, Sec. 7680 et seq.) brought this action to con-
demn three and nine-tenths acres of the appellee's land in Parke County.
Appraisers were appointed and assessed the damages to the land at $7,000.
The State in this action requested instructions to the effect that in arriv-
ing at the compensation to be awarded to the appellee that the benefits as
well as the damages to the land should be taken into consideration. The
court refused this instruction. The State relied on See. 7685 of Burns'
1926, reading in part "in case land is sought to be taken by a municipal
corporation for public use that confers any benefits on the land, the report
shall also state the benefits." The State's contention is in effect that it
is a municipal corporation within the contemplation of the above section
and that therefore the benefits to the land should have been reported
along with the damages. Held: The State is not a municipal corporation
within the meaning of Sec. 7685, Burns' 1926. State v. Brubeck, Supreme
Court of Indiana, Feb. 19, 1930, 170 N. E. 81.
The State has the power of eminent domain. State of Georg.*a v. City
of Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 44 Sup. Ct. 369. A state has the right to
say upon what property or to what extent the right of eminent domain
shall be exercised. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville and Nash-
ville R. R. Co., 258 U. S. 13. A municipal corporation has no inherent
power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when authorized and
in the manner authorized by the State Legislature. City of Los Angeles
v. Koyer, 48 Cal. App. 720, 192 Pac. 301.
In Indiana a municipal corporation has been given the right of eminent
domain and as an incident to that right has been given the privilege of
assessing the benefits as well as the damages to the land in arriving at
the compensation to be awarded. Acts of 1905, ch. 48-7680 Burns 1926.
The State has the power of eminent domain inherently, but unless it can
qualify under the above statute as a municipal corporation it must com-
pensate for the damage done but cannot take advantage of the benefits
conferred on the land, to reduce the compensation to be paid for the land.
A municipal corporation is a body corporate and politic created by law
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and invested with special powers relating to the government of its own
local affairs. Vaughtman v. Town of Waterloo, 14 Ind. App. 649. A
municipal corporation possesses a corporate capacity distinct from the
State. Hanson v. Cresco, 132 Iowa 533, 109 N. W. 1109. The State is
not a municipal corporation. Armstrong v. State Bank of Mayville, 227
N. Y. 563. Hays v. McDaniel, (1917) 130 Ark. 52, 196 S. W. 934. 43
Corpus Juris 72, Sec. 10.
Since the State is not a municipal corporation, it.must therefore give
compensation for damages without being allowed to consider the benefits
in determining the price to be paid the property owner.
This is the first decision on this precise point in Indiana and comes at
a time when the State's highway improvement projects render it an
important decision. The Supreme Court in this case has clearly decided
in accord with both principle and authority. T. H. F.
EVIDENC--REs GESTAE--CONNECTING CIRCUMSTANCES-Charles Phil-
lips, an employee of G. W. Opell Company, had loaded a truck with bread
at his employer's plant and, before delivering this bread, returned to his
home at 5 a. m., as was his custom, to eat breakfast. After eating he went
outside with a bucket of water to fill the radiator, and while doing this
was shot and died soon after. Before dying he told his wife that one
Green, a neighbor, had fired the shot. The police were notified; they
arrested Green, took him to the police station, and held a conversation
with him about 1 hours after the shooting. Phillips' widow brought
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act against appellant,
and introduced as a witness the chief of police who had examined Green.
Appellant objected to this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay
as to Green's declarations made to the witness. From an award in favor
of appellee, the G. W. Opell Company appeals. Held: Reversed with
directions-to Industrial Board to set aside its award. The testimony of
what Green said was incompetent, and without it there is no basis for an
award of compensation. G. W. Opell Co. v. Phillips et al., Appellate Court
of Indiana, December 20, 1929, 169 N. E. 354.
It was held in Daywitt v. Daywitt, 63 Ind. App. 444, that surrounding
facts and accompanying declarations to explain the act done or the motive
therefor, are included in the res gestae and are admissible though hearsay.
The court gave little consideration to appellee's contention that Green's
statements to the officer were part of the res gestae; without discussing
the matter it decided the evidence was "pure hearsay." To be admissible
as part of the res gestae, declarations usually must be made contem-
poraneous with the principal fact, or so near in point of time that they
will be regarded as part of the transaction. Ft. Wayne Tract. Co. v.
Roudebush, 173 Ind. 57. There is ample authority within and without the
state to support the court's view that under the circumstances this was
not part of the res gestae. Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind. App. 428, a suit for
false imprisonment, held that statements made by defendant to a police-
man after the plaintiff had been released were properly excluded. And
the testimony of a policeman concerning his conversation with the driver
of a car immediately after an accident, was not received as part of the
